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I. INTRODUCTION
Substantive consolidation is a powerful vehicle in bankruptcy by
which the assets and liabilities of one or more entities are combined
and treated for bankruptcy purposes as belonging to a single enterprise.
Because substantive consolidation vitally affects the rights and interests
of parties involved in bankruptcy proceedings, it is termed a matter
"pregnant with consequence"' and should be used with caution. Sub-
stantive consolidation is not a common occurrence because it exacts
strict requirements in order to protect the parties that it affects. Be-
cause substantive consolidation lacks clear statutory guidance, however,
courts examine the facts of each case closely to ascertain whether con-
solidation is warranted.
The dearth of literature on the subject led one commentator to
term substantive consolidation a "neglected corner of the law."' As cor-
porations increasingly use multitiered structures to gain tax advantages
and perform business operations, however, substantive consolidation
must be understandable and predictable so that parties in bankruptcy
proceedings may avoid undesirable changes to their security status.3 In
multi-entity cases in which the economic prejudice caused by continued
entity separateness outweighs the potential prejudice that accompanies
consolidation, bankruptcy's equitable remedy of substantive consolida-
tion provides relief.4 A creditor that lends to a specific entity must un-
derstand substantive consolidation so that the creditor's bargained for
1. See In re Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 191, 193 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1977).
2. Berry, Consolidation in Bankruptcy, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343, 371 (1976).
3. See In re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4 Bankr. 407, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). Substantive
consolidation of a parent corporation and its subsidiaries has been utilized increasingly as a mech-
anism to deal with debtor corporations. Id. Furthermore, "[t]his relatively recent development has
been given judicial effect without the benefit of statutory authority or approval by way of rule of
procedure." Id.
4. See In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
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expectation of satisfaction from the entity's assets will not be impaired.
Debtors similarly should understand substantive consolidation in order
to prepare effective reorganization plans and predict court action affect-
ing estate assets. Further, a creditor, debtor, or any party in interest
should understand how substantive consolidation can be used tactically
to protect a priority interest or prevent a loss of assets. Part II of this
Note explores the requirements and consequences of substantive con-
solidation. Part III analyzes the evolution of substantive consolidation
through the circuit courts. Part IV addresses ancillary issues and the
tactical uses of substantive consolidation. Part V concludes that sub-
stantive consolidation is not an ill-defined trap to be feared by credi-
tors. Because an order for consolidation requires a delicate balance of
equities, creditors can expect protection generally given to them under
the Bankruptcy Code.
II. REQUIREMENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION
A. Consequences of Substantive Consolidation
Substantive consolidation in bankruptcy is a process by which the
assets and liabilities of different entities are consolidated and treated as
a single entity.5 The consolidated assets create a single fund from which
all of the claims against the consolidated debtors are satisfied.' Credi-
tors of single entities before consolidation become joint creditors with
all creditors of the consolidated debtors after the proceeding. These
joint creditors share equally7 in the assets of the consolidated estate.8
Substantive consolidation also eliminates intercompany claims of the
debtor companies 9 and duplicative claims against related debtors. 10
Creditors of the consolidated entities are combined for purposes of vot-
5. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1100.06[1], at 1100-31 to -32 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
6. See In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Parkway
Calabasas, Ltd., 89 Bankr. 832, 836-37 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
7. Unless separate provisions are made in the reorganization plan, all creditors of the con-
solidated entities will be treated equally at distribution. Tatelbaum, The Multi-Tiered Corporate
Bankruptcy and Substantive Consolidation-Do Creditors Lose Rights and Protection?, 89 CoM.
L.J. 285, 285 (1984); see also In re DRW Property Co. 82, 54 Bankr. 489, 494 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1985); In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (recognizing the poten-
tial harm to the creditor of a more solvent debtor when this creditor is forced to share a common
fund comprised of the assets of less solvent affiliated debtors).
8. Filing a bankruptcy petition automatically creates an "estate." See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987). A bankruptcy filing affects the debtor's use of its property by creating
"property of the estate." D. EPSTEIN, J. LANDERS & S. NicKLEs, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 734 (3d ed.
1987) [hereinafter DEBTORS]. The "property of the estate" generally includes all property of the
debtor at the time of the bankruptcy ffling. Id. at 735.
9. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966); see Park-
way Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 836-37.
10. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847; DRW Property, 54 Bankr. at 494.
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ing on reorganization plans.11 Because substantive consolidation dra-
matically affects the rights and interests of creditors and affiliated
debtors, 12 the process should be used sparingly 3 and occurs only in un-
usual circumstances.14
Substantive consolidation threatens to prejudice the rights of credi-
tors because separate debtors ordinarily will have different ratios of as-
sets to liabilities. The creditor of a debtor whose asset-to-liability ratio
is higher than that of its affiliated debtor will receive a proportionately
smaller satisfaction of its claim because the asset-to-liability ratio of the
merged estates will be lower.'"
B. Bankruptcy Courts' Power to Consolidate
No express statutory authority exists that empowers bankruptcy
courts to order substantive consolidation. 6 Rather, courts find the
power to impose substantive consolidation in the general "equity pow-
ers" 17 expressed in section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code.'8 A bankruptcy
11. Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518; see 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, q 1100.06[1],
at 1100-32 n.1.
12. See In re Flora Mir Candy Corp., 432 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1970).
13. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847; see In re Donut Queen, Ltd., 41 Bankr. 706, 709 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1984).
14. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, % 1100.061], at 1100-32.1 (stating that substan-
tive consolidation is rare because of the potential inequalities caused when certain creditors are
forced to share on a parity with creditors of a less solvent entity). One commentator has remarked
that a presumption against substantive consolidation exists. Because substantive consolidation can
upset the basic assumptions upon which lenders extend credit, courts should grant orders seeking
consolidation cautiously. Substantive consolidation "can amount to changing the rules after the
game has been played." Thornton, The Continuing Presumption Against Substantive Consolida-
tion, 105 BANKING L.J. 448, 451 (1988).
15. See Snider Bros., 18 Bankr. at 234.
16. See Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518; 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, q
1100.0611], at 1100-32. A debtor may, however, provide for consolidation in Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy. Section 1123(a)(5)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that a reorganization
plan may include the merger or consolidation of the reorganized debtor with other entities. 11
U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(C) (1982). Of course, the debtor's creditors must approve such a plan through
the voting process. See DRW Property, 54 Bankr. at 497-98.
17. See Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518 n.1; Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 837 (noting
that substantive consolidation is a creature of court-made law). The principle is well established
that "'courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently pro-
ceedings in equity.'" Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934)); see also Berry, supra note 2, at 351 (advising that a challenge directed at
the court's lack of statutory authority is unlikely to succeed).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. V 1987). The terms "Bankruptcy Code" and "Code" are used
herein to denote provisions in Title 11, United States Code. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code is
derived from § 2(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). See 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1100.0611], at 1100-32 n.2. Many of the leading substan-
tive consolidation cases arose under the Bankruptcy Act. Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 837 n.4.
The Bankruptcy Code is silent on substantive consolidation. The prior cases, however, subject to
any more recent case law, continue to be good law. Id. (perceiving "no policy of the Bankruptcy
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court's broad equity powers may be exercised only in a manner consis-
tent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.19 The equity powers
enable a bankruptcy court to disregard separate corporate entities and
to pierce the several corporate veils in order to satisfy the debts of a
related entity.20 Thus, when a corporation is a mere instrumentality or
alter ego of the bankrupt corporation and has no independent exis-
tence, equity favors disregarding the separate corporate entities.2' The
Advisory Committee Notes to Bankruptcy Rule 101522 acknowledge the
power to consolidate but state that Rule 1015 neither authorizes nor
prohibits consolidation involving two or more separate debtors. " The
Supreme Court tacitly approved the power to impose substantive con-
solidation in Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp.4
Code that would change the prior law on substantive consolidation"). Attempts by debtors to dis-
miss a case under the old Act and refile under the new Code, however, were prohibited expressly.
Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., 454 U.S. 354, 357-60 (1982) (dis-
allowing the debtor's attempt to dismiss its Chapter 11 case under the old Act in order to refile
and consolidate substantively with its subsidiaries and affiliates under Chapter 11 of the new
Code). See generally Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U. PIrr. L.
REV. 477, 482-85 (1988).
Section 105 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code reads:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue
by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court
orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (Supp. V 1987).
19. In re J.M. Wells, Inc., 575 F.2d 329, 331 (1st Cir. 1978).
20. In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976); see In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 921, 928 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Tito
Castro Constr., 14 Bankr. 569, 571 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1981). But cf. infra notes 77-81 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the misplaced analogy of bankruptcy's process of substantive consolidation to
corporate law's notion of piercing the corporate veil to impose liability).
21. Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d at 928.
22. BANKR. R. 1015. Rule 1015 governs the consolidation or joint administration of cases in-
volving the same debtor or two or more related debtors. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note
5, Rule 1015 (a), (b), at 1015-1. Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) provides:
If a joint petition or two or more petitions are pending in the same court by or against (1) a
husband and wife, or (2) a partnership and one or more of its general partners, or (3) two or
more general partners, or (4) a debtor and an affiliate, the court may order a joint administra-
tion of.the estates.
BANKR. R. 1015(b).
23. See BANK& R. 1015(b) advisory committee's note. Rather, "the propriety of consolidation
depends on substantive considerations and affects the substantive rights of the creditors of the
different estates." Id.
24. 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941) (stating that "[tihe power of the bankruptcy court to
subordinate claims or to adjudicate equities arising out of the relationship between the [corpora-
tion's and shareholders'] creditors is complete"); see also Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 837.
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C. Comparison to Joint Administration
Substantive consolidation must not be confused with the related
procedure of joint administration. 5 Joint administration is a procedure
by which courts hear two or more related cases of entities that have
filed bankruptcy petitions as a single case. 6 The purpose of joint ad-
ministration is to make case administration easier and less costly.27 The
process has been called a "creature of procedural convenience," 28 be-
cause it avoids the duplication of effort that would result if cases in-
volving related debtors were to proceed separately. 9
The most significant difference between joint administration and
substantive consolidation is that joint administration requires the es-
tate of each debtor to be kept separate and distinct.30 Joint administra-
tion does not affect the substantive rights of creditors and other
interested parties.,1 Thus, administrative efficiency is achieved without
sacrificing the parties' substantive rights.32 Conversely, substantive con-
solidation effects a merger33 of the consolidated debtors' estates, which
creates a single estate that is recognized throughout the remaining
bankruptcy process. 3 4
Other significant differences between joint administration and sub-
stantive consolidation exist.35 Because only a single estate remains after
consolidation, interentity accounts and interentity claims are elimi-
25. Joint administration also is known as "procedural consolidation" see 5 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY, supra note 5, 1 1100.07, at 1100-47, and "administrative consolidation," Parkway
Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 836. For a more thorough discussion of joint administration, see 5 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1100.07, at 1100-47 to -50; B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANK-
RUPTCY LAw MANUAL I 1.08[3], at 1-30 (rev. ed. 1986).
26. See Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 836.
27. Id.
28. In re Steury, 94 Bankr. 553, 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988).
29. Id. at 553-54. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1015 state that the combination of
estates under joint administration allows the use of a single docket for the listing of filed claims,
the combination of notices to creditors of different estates, and the joint handling of administra-
tive matters. See BANK& R. 1015 advisory committee's note; see also supra note 21.
30. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 25, I 8.16, at 8-74.
31. Id. An order of joint administration should not have any substantive effect on the cases
being administered and does not indicate a court's predilection toward substantive consolidation.
Tatelbaum, supra note 7, at 285.
32. See In re N.S. Garrott & Sons, 63 Bankr. 189, 191 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986).
33. Substantive consolidation's "nearest non-bankruptcy analogy is the merger of two corpo-
rations under state law." Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 836.
34. See id. at 836-37. For a discussion of "estate," see supra note 8.
35. But see Seligson & Mandell, Multi-Debtor Petition-Consolidation of Debtors and Due
Process of Law, 73 CoML L.J. 341, 346 (1968) (expressing the view that "[n]o useful purpose" is
served in distinguishing procedural from substantive consolidation). The commentators state that
"[iut is doubtful that there can be a consolidation of separate entities which affects only procedural
rights. It would seem that every consolidation, however characterized, is likely to have an impact
upon the substantive rights of at least some of the parties involved." Id. at 347.
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nated.5 6 Creditors of specific entities no longer can look only to the as-
sets of the debtor with which they bargained for satisfaction of their
claims. Rather, creditors of the separate entities must look to the assets
of the consolidated estate and become creditors of the consolidated en-
tity. 7 In joint administration, however, the debtors' estates are separate
and interentity claims survive. 8 Further, the creditors of each jointly
administered entity may look only to the assets of the debtor with
which they bargained for satisfaction of their claims.3 9
D. Flexibility of Substantive Consolidation
Substantive consolidation is not an absolute proposition. 0 Bank-
ruptcy courts may order less than complete consolidation and may
place conditions on the consolidation41 in order to protect the interests
of creditors or to effect an equitable remedy.42 The circuit courts in In
re Gulfco Investment Corp.,4 s In re Flora Mir Candy Corp.," and In re
Continental Vending Machine Corp.48 suggest means by which certain
creditor groups may be protected in consolidation.46 Similarly, the court
in Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Khee147 admonished that
''equity is not helpless to reach a rough approximation of justice to
some rather than deny any to all.''14 Notwithstanding their significant
discretionary authority, courts must adhere to bankruptcy's two funda-
mental policies of fair treatment of creditors and strict observance of
priorities that exist between various creditor classes.49
36. See Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 837. In addition, parties may request that all dupli-
cate claims for the same indebtedness be expunged and all cross-corporate guarantees of the debt-
ors be eliminated and disallowed. See In re Commercial Envelope Mfg. Co., 14 Collier Bankr. Cas.
(MB) 191, 193 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977).
37. Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 837; see also N.S. Garrott & Sons, 63 Bankr. at 191.
38. Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 836.
39. Id. (noting that joint administration requires the respective entities to maintain separate
banking and accounting records).
40. See In re Steury, 94 Bankr. 553, 556 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988).
41. Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 837.
42. See In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d
Cir. 1966) (stating that because substantive consolidation is premised on equity powers, bank-
ruptcy courts can shape a remedy to fit the immediate problem).
43. 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1979); see infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
44. 432 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970); see infra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
45. Continental Vending, 517 F.2d at 997; see infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
46. Other courts have been successful in tailoring consolidation to achieve an equitable re-
sult. See, e.g., Steury, 94 Bankr. at 557 (ordering consolidation and enjoining husband and wife
debtors from invoking an Indiana statutory exemption by filing separate petitions).
47. 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966).
48. Id. at 847.
49. See Berry, supra note 2, at 357; see also Gulfco, 593 F.2d at 927 (noting that secured
creditors are to be placed in a different and superior class from unsecured creditors). The latter
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E. Procedures for Consolidation
Courts are not the only bodies that may initiate a proposal for con-
solidation. Requests for consolidation affirmatively may be made pursu-
ant to a reorganization plan. Additionally, so long as substantive
consolidation is justified, whether the bankruptcy cases originally were
filed as voluntary or involuntary petitions is irrelevant. 1 The party
seeking consolidation, whether a creditor, trustee, party in interest, or
debtor, bears the burden of proving the requisites of consolidation.52
Absent a clear and convincing showing that consolidation is warranted,
however, consolidation will not be granted.53
F. Who May Be Consolidated
In substantive consolidation cases, the relationship between the en-
tities to be consolidated is more important than the individual nature
of each entity.54 Thus, whether an entity is indistinguishable from its
affiliates is more important than whether the entity is labeled a part-
nership, corporation, or subsidiary. There is no restriction, however, re-
garding the type of entity that may be consolidated. Entities subject to
consolidation include individuals, partnerships, corporations, and their
policy also is known as the absolute priority rule. Berry, supra note 2, at 357. The absolute priority
rule provides:
Beginning with the topmost class of claims against the debtor, each class in descending rank
must receive full and complete compensation for the rights surrendered before the next class
below may properly participate. Thus, the principle is applied as between senior and junior
secured creditors, secured creditors and unsecured creditors, between unsecured creditors and
stockholders, between different classes of stockholders, and, of course, between secured credi-
tors as a whole and stockholders.
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1125.02, at 1125-8. See generally Norwest Bank Worth-
ington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988); Consolidated Rock Prods. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 520-21
(1941).
50. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 25, 8.16, at 8-77; see also Tatelbaum, supra
note 7, at 285 (noting that substantive consolidation can be effected by confirmation of a reorgani-
zation plan). Rather than liquidating, certain debtors may rehabilitate via a plan of reorganization
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code's Chapter 11, Chapter 12, or Chapter 13. Unlike a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion invoking a sale of the debtor's assets, a plan of reorganization enables a debtor to formulate a
plan of prolonged payments to creditors who are paid from postpetition earnings of the debtor. See
DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 710-12.
51. Steury, 94 Bankr. at 555; B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 25, 1 2.11, at 2-33; see,
e.g., In re Tureaud, 59 Bankr. 973, 974 (N.D. Okla. 1986) (application for substantive consolidation
granted in an involuntary bankruptcy case).
52. Steury, 94 Bankr. at 554; see also In re Tito Castro Constr., 14 Bankr. 569, 571 (Bankr.
D.P.R. 1981). One court has stated that "[a] necessary corollary of this proposition is that it is
incumbent upon the party seeking consolidation to demonstrate that it would be prejudiced if the
estates were to remain as separate." In re Donut Queen, Ltd., 41 Bankr. 706, 709 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1984).
53. Tatelbaum, supra note 7, at 286.
54. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1 1100.06[1], at 1100-33.
214 [Vol. 43:207
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affiliates. 55 Debtors even may be consolidated with nondebtors.56 The
most common occasion for substantive consolidation, however, is the
consolidation of affiliated debtor corporations. 7
G. Prerequisites for Substantive Consolidation
1. Factors to Be Considered
Because the application of substantive consolidation lacks statu-
tory direction," courts must examine the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine whether consolidation is warranted.59 Courts
and commentators have attempted to catalog the various factors that
warrant substantive consolidation.e" Courts frequently cite seven para-
mount factors when considering a motion for consolidation.6 1 The seven
55. Id. The treatise states that "the assets and liabilities of an individual debtor and an
affiliated corporation can be consolidated as can assets and liabilities of (i) an individual and one
or more partnerships, (ii) affiliated partnerships, (iii) affiliated partnerships and corporations, and
(iv) affiliated corporations." Id.
56. See id. at 1100-46. The treatise notes, however, that when a motion for consolidation
proposes the consolidation of nondebtors with debtors, other remedies often are available that are
less drastic than substantive consolidation. If assets have been transferred fraudulently, a debtor's
remedy ordinarily will be an action to recover a fraudulent conveyance under § 544 or § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code. If the assets were held without colorable claim, the debtor's remedy would be to
seek a turn-over under § 542 of the Code. Id.
57. Id. at 1100-33.
58. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
59. "The result is that substantive consolidation cases are to a great degree sui generis." 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1100.06[1], at 1100-33 (footnote omitted); see also
Tatelbaum, supra note 7, at 286.
60. Collier notes:
[C]ourts have focused special attention on the nature of the relationship between the entities
to be consolidated and the effect of consolidation on the creditors of each entity .... Where
consolidation has been granted, however, certain facts or combinations of facts exist and pro-
vide the predicate for consolidation. These factual predicates are as follows:
(i) creditors of the affiliates dealt with such affiliates as an economic unit and did not rely
on their separate identity in extending credit;
(ii) assets of one entity have been transferred to another entity without fair consideration
or with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors of the transferor and the transfer or
transfers cannot be undone in a manner which would protect the rights of creditors of the
transferor;
(iii) the affairs of the affiliated entities are so entangled that it would be costly and time-
consuming to deal with them separately; and
(iv) the separate legal identities of affiliates ha[ve] not been preserved and piercing the
corporate veil of one or more affiliates is required to protect the rights of creditors of a related
affiliate.
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1 1100.06[1], at 1100-33 to -34 (footnotes omitted).
61. See Holywell Corp. v. Bank of New York, 59 Bankr. 340, 347 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Miami Center Ltd. Partnership v. Bank of New York, 820 F.2d 376
(11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 69 (1988). Additionally, courts mention ten factors culled
from Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1940), in which the court listed factors arising from
disregarding the limited liability of corporations that are relevant to substantive consolidation.
The factors from Fish follow:
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factors include:
(1) The presence or absence of consolidated financial statements;
(2) The unity of interests and ownership between various corporate entities;
(3) The existence of parent and intercorporate guarantees on loans;
(4) The degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining individual assets
and liabilities;
(5) The existence of transfers of assets without formal observance of corporate
formalities;
(6) The commingling of assets and business functions;
(7) The profitability of consolidation at a single physical location.2
Because consolidation into a single fund affects numerous interests, the
existence of any set of factors will not guarantee an order for consolida-
tion.6 3 Furthermore, courts may ignore the presence or absence of cer-
tain factors in order to fashion relief equitably under consolidation . 4
Ascertaining whether certain factors exist is merely an initial step
in the courts' process of considering the propriety of substantive consol-
idation. Several courts list relevant factors without ranking their impor-
tance.6 5 These courts apply each factor to a case's facts, but the absence
(1) Parent owns all or majority of capital stock of subsidiary.
(2) Parent and subsidiary have common directors or officers.
(3) Parent finances subsidiary.
(4) Parent subscribes to all capital stock or otherwise causes its incorporation.
(5) Subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(6) Parent pays salaries or expenses or losses of subsidiary.
(7) Subsidiary has substantially no business except that with parent or no assets except those
conveyed to it by the parent.
(8) Parent refers to subsidiary as a department or division.
(9) Directors or officers of subsidiary do not act independently in interest of subsidiary but
take orders from parent.
(10) Formal legal requirements of subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are
not observed.
See id. at 191.
62. Holywell Corp., 59 Bankr. at 347 (citing In re Donut Queen, Ltd., 41 Bankr. 706, 709
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (summarizing seven factors stated in In re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4 Bankr.
407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980))); see Tatelbaum, supra note 7, at 287; see also supra note 60
(listing "factual predicates").
63. Although courts list relevant competing factors and balance them to ensure that consoli-
dation will be beneficial, "[c]learly, there is no formulaic resolution." In re Tureaud, 59 Bankr.
973, 975 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986); see also In re DRW Property Co. 82, 54 Bankr. 489, 495
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (stating that the set of factors alone should not be dispositive of the issue
of substantive consolidation). "[T]he fact that corporate formalities may have been ignored, or
that ... debtors are associated ... in some way, does not by itself lead inevitably to the conclu-
sion that it would be equitable to merge otherwise separate estates." In re Donut Queen, Ltd., 41
Bankr. 706, 709 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 234
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)).
64. See Tatelbaum, supra note 7, at 288 (but noting that a majority of factors is necessary to
sustain the burden of proof for consolidation); see also In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 84 Bankr.
315, 321 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.) (stating that "the [c]ourt must determine what equity requires"), rev'd,
860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
65. Tureaud, 59 Bankr. at 975; see, e.g., AugielRestivo, 860 F.2d at 518 (2d Cir. 1988);
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of one or more factors will not necessarily defeat a request for consoli-
dation."6 The Second Circuit ultimately noted that the respective analy-
ses of the factors are merely efforts to determine two critical facts: (1)
whether creditors dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and
did not extend credit to the entities with reliance on their separate
identities; and (2) whether the economic affairs of the debtors are so
entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors."
Other courts use the factors to perform a balancing test. 8 Specifi-
cally, the equities favoring consolidation are balanced against the equi-
ties favoring continued debtor separateness. 9 These courts require that
the benefits of consolidation outweigh the harm that consolidation
would cause to creditors.70 Courts recognize that the cited factors
merely aid the ultimate determination of whether consolidation is war-
ranted 1 and observe a two-step analysis in that determination. First, a
need for consolidation must exist.72 Second, the benefits of consolida-
tion must outweigh whatever harm it might create. s When factors con-
flict or when critical factors are absent, courts determine whether the
benefits of consolidation outweigh any detriment to objecting parties.74
Finally, substantive consolidation must not impair the policies of
the Bankruptcy Code. Equal treatment of creditor classes is one of
bankruptcy's primary goals.7" Thus, substantive consolidation must not
benefit one group of creditors to the detriment of similarly situated
creditor groups.76
Holywell Corp., 59 Bankr. at 347; In re Manzey Land & Cattle Co., 17 Bankr. 332, 337 (Bankr.
D.S.D. 1982) (granting a request for consolidation made by debtor farmers in pre-Chapter 12 case);
In re Richton Int'l Corp., 12 Bankr. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4
Bankr. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
66. See Holywell Corp., 59 Bankr. at 341, 347. Holywell noted that many courts apply a
seven-part objective inquiry into the interrelationships of the entities to be consolidated, but "not
all of [the factors] must be found to support consolidation." Id. at 347.
67. Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518.
68. Tureaud, 59 Bankr. at 976; see, e.g., DRW Property, 54 Bankr. at 489.
69. Donut Queen, 41 Bankr. at 709.
70. See, e.g., DRW Property, 54 Bankr. 489, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (citing Donut
Queen, 41 Bankr. at 709).
71. See In re Steury, 94 Bankr. 553, 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988). The factors serve as "noth-
ing more than sign posts along the road." Id.
72. See, e.g., In re Lewellyn, 26 Bankr. 246, 251 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1982).
73. See, e.g., Steury, 94 Bankr. at 554; Augie/Restivo, 84 Bankr. at 321; Lewellyn, 26 Bankr.
at 251 (stating that "[i]n addition to need the court must find that the consolidation will be fair to
creditors").
74. See In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
75. See id. at 276-77; Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 1942).
76. See Lewellyn, 26 Bankr. at 252 (granting a request for consolidation after determining




2. Misplaced Analogy to Corporate Law
The factors evaluated on a motion for substantive consolidation ap-
pear similar to an analysis of piercing the corporate veil. Like piercing
the corporate veil, substantive consolidation ignores artificial structures
legally defining the consolidated entities. Ultimately, however, such an
analogy is misplaced7 7 because the corporate law doctrine of limited lia-
bility is not involved.78 Rather, substantive consolidation is more like
the corporate law notion of enterprise liability because substantive con-
solidation does not seek to hold shareholders liable for the acts of their
incorporated entity.7 9 Substantive consolidation more closely resembles
the bankruptcy rule of subordination because competition for the con-
solidated assets is between creditors alone.8 0 Thus, substantive consoli-
dation ignores artificial legal structures but looks only to the combined
assets of the consolidated entities for satisfaction of all claims against
the collective group.8 '
3. Reliance Interest of Creditors
Courts are sensitive to creditors' expectations of seeking satisfac-
tion from the specific entity to which the creditor has extended credit.
Creditors' reliance on the separateness of their debtors is important be-
cause voluntary creditors assess the risks of lending to a particular
debtor and adjust the terms of the credit agreement accordingly.82 Con-
77. See DRW Property, 54 Bankr. at 496; infra note 81.
78. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bank-
ruptcy, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 589, 634 (1975).
79. The corporate law policy of limited liability is not disturbed by bankruptcy consolida-
tion. The policy of limited liability is designed to protect stockholders "who, by definition, are not
involved when the parent [corporation] is a bankrupt." Id. at 632. Enterprise liability, however,
presumes that an artificial division of a single economic enterprise into two or more separate cor-
porations should not be permitted to defeat a plaintiff's recovery merely because the plaintiff dealt
with a particular corporation with insufficient assets to satisfy the judgment. Berle, The Theory of
Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 348 (1947). See generally L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ & J.
BAUMAN; CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLIcY 258-63 (2d ed. 1988).
80. Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for subordination of claims. See 11 U.S.C. §
510 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Subordinated claims receive payments after certain other claims. See
DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 818. See generally Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of
Claims in Bankruptcy, 16 VAND. L. REv. 83 (1961).
81. Piercing the corporate veil may not be necessary to effect a consolidation. Lewellyn, 26
Bankr. at 253. Lewellyn further noted:
While many of the considerations leading to a decision to consolidate may also lead to a
conclusion that corporate identities should be disregarded, such a conclusion is not compelled.
The standard for consolidation, . . . that "the interrelationships of the group are hopelessly
obscured and the time and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble them so sub-
stantial as to threaten the realization of any net assets for all the creditors,["] does not re-
quire any "piercing of the corporate veil."
Id. (quoting In re Win. Glucken Co., 457 F. Supp. 379, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
82. Indeed, Judge Friendly based his concurrence in Kheel on the basis that the objecting
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solidation threatens to destroy the bases of such risk calculations by
creating a new entity from which the creditors must look for payment.
If a solvent subsidiary is consolidated with its insolvent parent, credi-
tors of the subsidiary suffer a decreased return on their claims because
assets of the subsidiary must be used to satisfy the claims of both the
subsidiary's and the parent's creditors. 3 Even more threatening is
bankruptcy's recognition of priority claims after consolidation. Claims
of priority creditors of a poorer company will be paid before the claims
of the general creditors of a wealthier company."'
Thus, creditors that extend credit to specific entities may not re-
ceive their expected return if forced to share the assets with creditors of
consolidated entities. Courts, therefore, respect and promote bank-
ruptcy's policy of fair treatment of creditors and will not order substan-
tive consolidation if it would deny such creditors the benefit of their
bargains.8 5 In the words of Judge Friendly, "[e]quality among creditors
who have lawfully bargained for different treatment is not equity but
its opposite ....",,6
A presumption exists, however, that creditors have not relied solely
on the credit of a particular entity that is subject to consolidation. 7
When objecting to a request for consolidation, a creditor that claims
reliance on an entity's separateness must show both an inquiry into
that debtor's independent financial health and an absence of evidence,
such as guarantees or consolidated financial statements, that would
tend to indicate interrelationships within a larger enterprise.88 If a cred-
party failed to establish that it relied on the separate credit of its mortgagor. Chemical Bank New
York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring). See gener-
ally Thornton, supra note 14, at 448.
83. See Tatelbaum, supra note 7, at 285 (stating that "[tihis is particularly exasperating to a
credit manager who must explain the situation to senior management after reliance upon financial
data of the solvent entity").
84. See Landers, supra note 78, at 630.
85. But see id. at 639 (noting that a rule rejecting consolidation which is "aimed at protect-
ing creditors who 'dealt with' the enterprise in ignorance of its [multi]corporate structure, protects
too large and amorphous a group and conflicts with the basic realities of multi-corporate
enterprises").
86. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 848 (Friendly, J., concurring). Different considerations are present
when the creditor claiming reliance on separateness is the parent or related affiliate of the debtor.
An order of consolidation appears less harsh to these creditors. When the veil of the parent or
affiliate is pierced, the managers of the larger enterprise are put on notice that mere nominal
corporate status will not shield one entity from enterprise liability. If the owners of the parent and
affiliates perceive the risks to be too great, they either can avoid engaging in the respective busi-
ness, conduct it as part of the parent's or affiliate's existing operations, or establish and maintain
the subsidiary as a viable corporate entity. An outside creditor has none of these options. Landers,
supra note 78, at 632.
87. In re Lewellyn, 26 Bankr. 246, 251-52 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1982).
88. Landers, supra note 78, at 630; see also In re Donut Queen, Ltd., 41 Bankr. 706, 710
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (movant for consolidation failed to demonstrate that it was aware of the
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itor makes such a showing, the court will order consolidation only if the
demonstrated benefits outweigh the harm."9
When creditors have not relied on the credit of a particular en-
tity,90 the practical economic and operational reality of a single enter-
prise suggests the need for a consolidation approach for multiple
bankruptcies. In such a nonreliance case, consolidation is compelling
because it would seem artificial to treat the entities as separate simply
because of the fortuitous occurrence of bankruptcy.91
One commentator has noted that a heavy handed application of the
reliance test is not warranted.2 Professor Landers reasons that courts'
heightened sensitivity to creditors that have relied on the credit of a
particular entity is anomalous because the doctrine of separate in-
corporability is not designed as a protection for creditors."" Rather, he
advocates a more restricted use of the reliance test so that the excep-
tion will not swallow the basic principle of consolidation.
III. EVOLUTION OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION THROUGH THE COURTS
OF APPEALS
A. Introduction
Substantive consolidation lacks statutory direction and, thus, is a
creature of case law. 5 A review of the cases that address consolidation
is enlightening9" because substantive consolidation depends almost en-
debtors' interrelationships and that it treated the debtors as a single enterprise).
89. In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing In re Continental
Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976)).
90. These creditors typically include involuntary creditors, creditors who make no inquiry
regarding the credit standing of their debtor, and creditors who rely on a group of debtors with
knowledge of their interconnectedness. See Landers, supra note 78, at 630.
91. Id. at 630-31.
92. See id. at 640.
93. Id.; see also id. at 592.
94. Id. at 640 (suggesting that the Second Circuit's avoidance of consolidation in order to
protect creditors that may have relied on debtor separateness approaches the level of "exception[s]
... swallow[ing] the basic principle of consolidation"). Professor Landers suggests that the estates
of affiliated entities in bankruptcy should be consolidated because:
(1) they are likely to be operated with a view to overall profitability; (2) creditors are likely to
perceive the separate companies as a group and to expect payment from the group; and (3)
whether any one company has a significant amount of assets to satisfy claims is likely to be
either fortuitous or the result of an attempt to favor certain creditors over others. Exceptions
should, however, be recognized upon a showing of either reliance by a general creditor or of
certain factors obviating the inherent enterprise tendencies of multi-corporate units.
Id. at 640-41.
95. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
96. See In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 234 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). The Snider court
provides a helpful examination of the following cases: In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 517
F.2d 997, 997 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); In re Flora Mir Candy Corp., 432
F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970); Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 845 (2d Cir.
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tirely on the facts of each situation and on the presence, absence, and
conflicts of the discrete factors.9 7 Although the facts of each case vary,
courts generally follow a uniform approach when considering a motion
for substantive consolidation.
The issue of substantive consolidation has received little attention
in the circuit courts, and the Supreme Court has approved it only tac-
itly. 8 Some appellate decisions mention substantive consolidation
merely in dicta9 or within the context of the court's consideration of
other issues. 100 The majority of the appellate decisions are from the
Second Circuit, yet uniformity appears among the remaining circuits,
federal district courts, and bankruptcy courts. This section of the Note
examines the evolution of substantive consolidation through the courts
of appeals. From Stone v. Eacho'0 to In re AugielRestivo Baking
Co.,102 the circuit courts have progressed from each decision ultimately
to display, perhaps surprisingly, a uniform mode of analysis in an area
of law critically dependent upon a proper balance of equities.
B. Stone v. Eacho
In Stone v. Eacho10 3 the Fourth Circuit allowed substantive consol-
idation in a case involving a motion to consolidate a bankrupt New
Jersey parent corporation, Tiptop Tailors, with one of its stores sepa-
rately incorporated in Virginia. The court allowed consolidation based
on findings that the subsidiary was not treated as a separate entity and
that the subsidiary's creditors dealt with the parent and subsidiary as
one entity. Further, the parent paid the bills of the Virginia store from
its New Jersey office. Thus, the court held that the Virginia creditors
must have known that the New Jersey parent was part of the enterprise
1966); Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964). See Snider, 18 Bankr. at 234-
38.
97. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also In re Tureaud, 59 Bankr. 973, 976
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986) (discussing Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215
(1941)). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Continental Vending, 517 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
99. The Fifth Circuit in In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1154 n.13 (5th Cir. 1987),
offered substantive consolidation as means for a creditor to make defendants of a state court ac-
tion parties to the bankruptcy proceeding. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711
F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (1st Cir. 1983) (offering substantive consolidation as precedent for piercing the
corporate veil in bankruptcy situations).
100. Although determining the issue of the validity of a nunc pro tunc order of consolida-
tion, the court in In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987), discussed the appro-
priate setting and policies of substantive consolidation but, for argument's sake, assumed that
consolidation was proper in the case.
101. 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942).
102. 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
103. 127 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1942).
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engaged in the Virginia business.'0 4 The court stated that it would look
beyond nominal corporate forms and treat the assets and liabilities of
the subsidiary as those of the parent.10 5
C. Soviero v. Franklin National Bank
The focus on creditor reliance again appears in Soviero v. Franklin
National Bank. 0 6 The court in Soviero affirmed an order consolidating
Raphan Carpet Corporation and thirteen of its affiliates. The determi-
native factor in Soviero was that creditors dealt with Raphan and its
affiliates as a single enterprise and could not demonstrate reliance on
any single affiliate. 07
A secured creditor of one of the Raphan affiliates objected to sub-
stantive consolidation on the ground that consolidation is proper only
when it can be shown that a subsidiary was organized to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors. 108 The court, however, found unity of interest and
ownership common to all entities and stated that adherence to the the-
ory of separate corporations would be unfair to creditors. 09
Thus, the court did not permit consolidation simply because of a
commingling of assets and disregard for corporate formalities. Rather,
the court recognized that an injustice to creditors would occur absent
consolidation." 0 The court suggested that when consolidation is other-
wise proper, creditors that knew or should have known of the unity of
interests and operations within the enterprise may be precluded from
subsequently claiming prejudice from consolidation."'
104. Stone, 127 F.2d at 287-88. Without consolidation, the Virginia creditors could have been
paid in full from the assets of the Virginia store. Creditors of the New Jersey parent, however,
would have received less than 30% of their claims. If the claim of the New Jersey parent corpora-
tion against its Virginia subsidiary were treated on a parity with the Virginia creditors' claims, the
Virginia creditors would have received substantially less than the parent corporation's creditors.
See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, % 1100.06[2], at 1100-36 (analyzing Stone).
105. Stone, 127 F.2d at 288-89.
106. 328 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1964).
107. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, q 1100.06[2], at 1100-38 (stating that "So-
viero underscores the theme of creditor reliance articulated in Stone v. Eacho and this theme is of
critical importance in subsequent cases"). Subordinate facts in Soviero also compelled consolida-
tion. The president and secretary of Raphan were the sole directors and shareholders of the affili-
ates. Raphan maintained accounting records for the affiliates at its principal place of business,
creditors were issued consolidated financial information, Raphan signed all of the affiliates' leases,
and the proceeds from sales by the affiliates were deposited into Raphan's account. Stationery and
advertising referred to the affiliates as "branches," not separate corporations. See Soviero, 328
F.2d at 447-48.
108. See Soviero, 328 F.2d at 448.
109. Id.
110. See In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 235 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (analyzing
Soviero).
111. See id. at 235.
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D. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel"2 introduced a new
justification for substantive consolidation. 113 The Second Circuit deter-
mined that consolidation was warranted because the cost of untangling
the "hopelessly" obscured financial records of the debtors would exceed
the benefit that would accrue from the disentangled records." 4 The
court enunciated a rigorous standard that coupled expense and diffi-
culty with the practical impossibility of restructuring the financial
records before allowing consolidation. 15 This standard requires the
problem of disentanglement to be so egregious that it threatens the re-
alization of any net assets."" Many subsequent parties urging consoli-
dation have attempted Kheel's entanglement argument but have fallen
short of its strict standard."17
Kheel involved the liquidation of eight shipping companies that
one individual owned or controlled. In addition, the companies oper-
ated in disregard of any corporate separateness."' Creditor Chemical
Bank argued that substantive consolidation was improper absent a find-
ing that a creditor dealt with a group believing it to be a single entity.1" 9
The court noted that the corporations shifted funds, made intercorpo-
rate loans, regularly paid each other's obligations, and made withdraw-
als and payments from and to corporate accounts without sufficient
recordkeeping.2 0 The court affirmed consolidation because the expense
to reconstruct the financial records of the debtors would extinguish any
112. 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966).
113. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1100.06[2], at 1100-38. Prior to Kheel,
substantive consolidation had been granted only in three situations: (1) if assets of an affiliate were
fraudulently transferred; (2) if creditors did not rely on the credit of a particular entity; and (3) if
creditors successfully could assert claims against a debtor's affiliate on alter-ego grounds. Id.
114. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847. The onerous costs that the court sought to avoid are those costs
imposed by §§ 503 and 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 507(a)(1) gives first priority status to
administrative expenses allowed by § 503(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982). Section 503(b)(4)
gives administrative expense status to services performed by an accountant or attorney for the
estate. See id. § 503(b)(4).
115. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847. Such a restructuring would be necessary to determine intercor-
porate claims, liabilities, and ownership of assets. See id.
116. Id.
117. See infra note 131 and accompanying text (In re Flora Mir Candy Corp.); infra note
154 and accompanying text (In re Gulfco Inv. Corp.); infra note 170 and accompanying text (In re
Augie/Restivo Baking Co.); see also infra notes 210-20 and accompanying text (discussing the
standard of accounting difficulties).
118. The United States, a major creditor, moved for consolidation of the proceedings. At-
tempts at a plan of reorganization had failed. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 846. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the motion and Chemical Bank appealed. Id.
119. Id. at 847.
120. Id. at 846.
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chance of recovery to the prepetition creditors." 1 In addition to avoid-
ing the time and effort of disentangling the debtors' affairs, consolida-
tion facilitated the previously infeasible determination, allowance, and
classification of claims of creditors prior to the preparation and submis-
sion of a plan for liquidation."
Judge Friendly's concurring opinion espoused a more cautious and
protectionist stance. He conceded that the impossibility of an accurate
assessment of the financial condition of debtors might warrant consoli-
dation. He felt, however, that every reasonable endeavor should be
made to reach a close approximation to protect the reliance interest of
creditors that, without knowledge of the interrelationships within a
larger enterprise, relied on the credit of a single entity."2
E. In re Flora Mir Candy Corp.
A unanimous court in In re Flora Mir Candy Corp."24 agreed with
Judge Friendly's emphasis on the reliance interest. Flora Mir illustrates
that substantive consolidation is not warranted when the harm to ob-
jecting creditors outweighs the concerns of the parties seeking consoli-
dation.1 5 The Flora Mir court addressed consolidation within the
context of one parent company and twelve subsidiaries and affiliates
that had filed for individual reorganization relief. In Flora Mir deben-
tures had been issued six years prior to the date that the issuer, Mead-
ors, Inc. (Meadors), was acquired by Flora Mir Candy Corporation
(Flora Mir). 2 " During a chain of transactions culminating with Flora
Mir's acquisition of Meadors, Meadors's debenture holders brought an
action in state court against two Flora Mir companies and Meadors for
fraud. 1 7 The debtors moved for consolidation.
The court refused to consolidate Meadors with the other debtors,
noting that the inequities of consolidation clearly outweighed its bene-
121. See id. at 847; see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1100.0612], at 1100-39
(analyzing Kheel). The court further noted that Soviero does not require the party seeking consoli-
dation affirmatively to prove that the party objecting to consolidation dealt with the entities as
one. To the contrary, whether a creditor relied solely on the credit of a single entity is an available
defense for the objecting creditor. See Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847; In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr.
230, 235-36 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
122. Kheel, 369 F.2d at 847.
123. Id. at 848. Judge Friendly stated: "Equality among creditors who have lawfully bar-
gained for different treatment is not equity but its opposite. . . ." Id. (Friendly, J., concurring).
124. 432 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970).
125. See Snider Bros., 18 Bankr. at 236-37 (analyzing Flora Mir).
126. Meadors was organized in 1961 to manufacture and sell candy. In 1963, however, Mead-
ors was sold to Keebler Company. The Meadors debenture holders gave up their conversion privi-
leges as part of the sale to Keebler. See Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 1061.
127. See id. at 1061.
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fits. '2 The Meadors debentures had been issued six years prior to Flora
Mir's acquisition of Meadors. Clearly these creditors had not relied on
the credit of any consolidated group.12 9 Further, consolidation not only
would eliminate Meadors's claim against Flora Mir for misappropria-
tion of assets but also would permit the creditors of Flora Mir and the
other companies to share in any recovery awarded in the state court
action involving the debenture issue. 30 The court emphatically stated
its doubt that any showing of accounting difficulty could warrant con-
solidation in such a situation.' The court recognized that consolida-
tion would be unfair to the debenture holders, even though most
general creditors had treated the debtors as one.132 Significantly, the
primary asset of Meadors was its misappropriation claim against Flora
Mir, a claim between affiliates that substantive consolidation would
have eliminated. l33
F. In re Continental Vending Machine Corp.
In re Continental Vending Machine Corp.' illustrates that sub-
stantive consolidation may be achieved pursuant to a plan for reorgani-
zation. The reorganization plan in Continental Vending proposed
consolidation of the unsecured claims against a parent and its subsidi-
128. Id. at 1062-63. The court heard testimony regarding a multitude of intercompany trans-
actions and the difficulty of disentangling them. This testimony had little to do with Meadors,
however, which had transacted little business after its acquisition. Id. at 1061-62. The Meadors
debenture holders opposed consolidation. Id. at 1062. Nevertheless, the referee had signed an order
directing consolidation that prompted the appellate court to state:
[T]he referee signed, without any material change, findings of fact and conclusions of law
submitted by the attorneys for the debtors and entered an order directing ... consolidat[ion]
The first ray of light for the Meadors debenture holders in many years was shed when
their petition to review this order came before a district judge possessed of robust common
sense. On examining the evidence [the district judge] found it to be "grossly insufficient to
prompt a court of equity" to consolidate Meadors with the other debtors....
The decision was so manifestly correct that we should hardly have written an opinion
were it not to make it plain that referees should not order consolidation on so flimsy a basis
as was done here.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
129. See id. at 1062-63.
130. Id. at 1063. These claims by Meadors and its debenture holders were transactions in
which the other companies' creditors "had not the slightest legitimate interest." Id.
131. Id. The court also noted that although consolidation would facilitate an expedient con-
summation of a reorganization plan, this desirable objective was subordinate to the rights of the
debenture holders. Id.
132. See id. (noting that the general trade creditors may be content to take what they can
get for the past debts); see also In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 236 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)
(analyzing Flora Mir). The court felt that equity required the isolation of the debenture holder
group from the other creditors. See id.
133. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, % 1100.06[2], at 1100-41.
134. 517 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
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ary. The plan did not, however, call for the collateral for the secured
claims to be consolidated, and the plan precluded the secured creditor's
position from being elevated or improved.13 5 The Second Circuit upheld
the plan as fair and equitable to the creditors.
The holding of Continental Vending is more complex than the
simple maxim that unsecured claims may be consolidated while secured
claims remain unconsolidated. 13 6 The court merely denied the benefits
of consolidation to the secured creditor13 7 because that creditor had ob-
tained exactly what it bargained for.3 " The case addressed the bank-
ruptcy of a parent corporation, Continental Vending Machine Corp.
(Continental), and its wholly owned subsidiary, Apco, Inc. (Apco). The
interested secured creditor of both entities was James Talcott, Inc.
(Talcott).l 9
The court predicted that liquidation of Talcott's security in Apco
would yield a surplus while the sale of the Continental security would
result in a deficiency.14 Talcott sought to apply the surplus of its Apco
lien to the Continental deficiency, 4' but the consolidation plan pro-
vided that a secured creditor's claim could not be elevated or improved
as a result of the consolidation.142 The court found that Talcott did not
have a lien on the Apco surplus, Talcott's secured claim against Apco
135. See id. at 1000 n.3.
136. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, supra note 5, 1 1100.06[2], at 1100-42. "In Continental
Vending, secured claims were not left unconsolidated while unsecured claims were consolidated.
Instead the court refused to consolidate collateral pools since the lender did not bargain for cross-
collateral." Id.
137. See Snider Bros., 18 Bankr. at 237.
138. Continental Vending, 517 F.2d at 1002.
139. Id. at 999. Talcott financed each corporation. Talcott's security in Continental was rep-
resented primarily by mortgages on vending machines. Id. From Apco, Talcott received assign-
ments of accounts receivable. Id. Significantly, however, the security agreements with each
corporation contained no cross-collateralization agreement or guarantee for the other's debts.
Thus, no provision allowed Talcott to set off the obligations of one corporation against the collat-
eral that it held to secure debts of the related corporation. Id.
140. Id.
141. On appeal Talcott argued that because improvement of some creditors' positions is in-
herent in consolidation, it would be unfair to permit unsecured creditors to improve their positions
while denying secured creditors such improvement. Id. The court dispensed with this argument by
holding that Talcott would receive "exactly what it bargained for." Id. at 1001.
Alternatively, Talcott argued that the broad language of each of its security agreements per-
mitted the Apco lien to cover the Continental deficit. Id. at 999. The court conceded that the
security agreements contained broad language but found that the Apco agreement "did not go so
far as to cover the debts of Continental." Id. at 1000. No further lien on Apco property could exist
because the Apco obligation was satisfied. Id.
142. Id. at 999. The originally proposed plan for reorganization included a complete merger
of the assets and liabilities of the two corporations. The cited caveat against secured creditor con-
solidation, however, was added to the plan by an amendment by the trustee when Talcott made
known its intention to apply the Apco surplus to the Continental deficiency. See Berry, supra note
2, at 366-67.
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was satisfied,143 and its unsecured claim against Continental was not
impaired. 144 Further, by negotiating separate security agreements with
Continental and Apco, Talcott certainly did not deal with the corpora-
tions in a mistaken belief that the two were one. Continental Vending
warns secured creditors that substantive consolidation will not increase
automatically a secured position by attaching a lien on the consolidated
estate.
14 5
G. In re Gulfco Investment Corp.
Although the secured creditor in Continental Vending was not en-
titled to improve its position, secured creditors in general received pro-
tection in In re Gulfco Investment Corp.1 6  The Tenth Circuit
considered substantive consolidation in Gulfco, which involved the pro-
posed consolidation of a parent, Gulf South Corp., with its subsidiar-
ies. 147 The court held that consolidation could not be used to eliminate
a creditor's security for the purpose of making the secured creditor an
unsecured creditor. 48 A group of creditors that opposed the district
court's order for consolidation brought the appeal.149 A parent company
pledged 51 percent of the stock of its subsidiary as security for a 1.8
million dollar loan.150 The creditor objected to consolidation of the sub-
sidiary with its parent because consolidation would deprive the creditor
143. Continental Vending, 517 F.2d at 1000.
144. See id. at 1002. Reasoning that Talcott's lien property was not prejudiced by the in-
tercompany transfers of assets that prejudiced the unsecured creditors, the court held that consoli-
dation of secured creditors was unnecessary because that group was not harmed. "Thus, it can be
seen clearly that consolidation is not a matter of simply showing corporate interrelationship, but
harm thereby as well." In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 237 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). For a
critical view of the majority's opinion in Continental Vending, see Berry, supra note 2, at 368-70
(attacking the majority's view that Talcott got "'exactly what it bargained for'" on grounds that
consolidation is not designed to satisfy the expectations of its parties (quoting Continental Vend-
ing, 517 F.2d at 1002)).
145. A secured creditor, however, successfully might assert a claim against property improp-
erly in the hands of a consolidated affiliate if such property constitutes the proceeds of the secured
party's collateral. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1100.06[2], at 1100-42, -43.
146. 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1979).
147. The corporate conglomerate is so complex that the court appended a chart to the opin-
ion for clarity. See id. at 932. The case, however, concerns only two subsidiaries, Delta Mortgage
Corp. and Horseshoe Development Corp. Id. at 923, 924. The district court found that the credi-
tors believed Delta and Horseshoe to be solvent. Id. at 924.
148. Id. at 927.
149. See id. at 924. The district court ordered consolidation based on what it called over-
whelming accounting difficulties. It held that the presence of common control coupled with the
Fish v. East factors, see supra note 61, warranted consolidation. Gulfco, 593 F.2d at 923. The court
of appeals noted that the strongest difference between Gulfco and Fish is that neither subsidiary
in Gulfco was organized fraudulently. Id. at 929.
150. Gulfco, 593 F.2d at 924.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:207
of the benefit of the pledged stock.151
The court held that consolidation may not be used to strip a se-
cured creditor of its security. The court recognized the bankruptcy
courts' broad powers and discretion, but noted that this authority does
not allow courts to ignore the absolute priority rule.15 2 The court af-
firmed the Continental Vending holding that security may not be used
to benefit other creditors while the secured creditors remain unsatis-
fied. 53 The court also renounced the district court's finding that consol-
idation was warranted simply because the stock comprising the
creditor's security was too difficult to value. Rather, the court emphati-
cally warned that administrative convenience, expediency, and account-
ing difficulties were inadequate to warrant treatment of a secured
creditor as unsecured 54 and stated that consolidation may not to be
used as a means of avoiding valuation. 5"
H. In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.
Substantive consolidation received little notice in the courts of ap-
peals after Gulfco. Bankruptcy and district courts using the standards
and guidance enunciated in the circuit court cases discussed above,
however, frequently decided the issue. 5 s Finally, nine years after
Gulfco, the Second Circuit addressed substantive consolidation in In re
151. Id. at 924. Horseshoe was considered solvent by its creditors. Id.
152. Id. at 926-27. For an explanation of the absolute priority rule, see supra note 49.
153. Gulfco, 593 F.2d at 927.
154. Id. Furthermore, the court held that the secured creditor, in this situation, would be
entitled to have its security, the Horseshoe shares, valued for purposes of assuring the secured
creditor of its proper priority in any proposed reorganization plan. Id.
The case also involved certain guarantees that the debtors gave in connection with certain
loans. The court noted that the guarantee by Horseshoe running to one creditor entitled that cred-
itor to status as an unsecured creditor of Horseshoe. Id. The court further noted, however, that if a
creditor has claims against more than one debtor arising out of the same transaction, that creditor
is entitled to only one satisfaction. Id. Once consolidation is ordered, the guarantees, which re-
present multiple claims, are eliminated. Thus, the court held, the unsecured creditor has only one
claim per transaction to be satisfied from pooled resources. Id. at 928.
One treatise, however, argues that this holding is incorrect:
On this point the court was wrong. Under the Code, a claim in respect of the guarantee of a
defaulted obligation is entitled to treatment on a parity with other unsecured claims. A credi-
tor owed $10 by a debtor subsidiary will have allowed claims in both the subsidiary proceed-
ing and in that of the parent guarantor. If the distribution to creditors of the subsidiary
equals 25% of claims and to creditors of the parent equals 10% of claims, the creditor re-
ceives a 35% recovery. If there is substantive consolidation and there is no other duplicate
claims, his recovery is approximately 18%.
5 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy, supra note 5, 1100.06[2], at 1100-43 n.32 (citation omitted).
155. Gulfco, 593 F.2d at 930. The court added that substantive consolidation "of unsecured
creditors may be an appropriate solution for some of the debtor corporations, but in no event can
secured creditors be deprived of their secured status . . . ." Id.
156. See, e.g., In re DRW Property Co. 82, 54 Bankr. 489 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In re
Donut Queen, Ltd., 41 Bankr. 706 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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Augie/Restivo Baking Co. 57 The court denied consolidation, holding
that the course of dealing and expectations of the parties did not justify
consolidation. 158
The case addressed the bankruptcy of Augie/Restivo Baking Co.,
Ltd. (Augie/Restivo) and Augie's Baking Company, Ltd. (Augie). Prior
to 1985, Augie and Restivo Brothers Bakers, Inc. (Restivo) were unre-
lated, family-run, wholesale bakeries. In January 1985, however, Augie
and Restivo effected an exchange of stock after which Restivo changed
its name to Augie/Restivo Baking Company, Ltd. The original Augie,
however, was not dissolved.159
The two entities borrowed from separate banks. Prior to 1985,
Union Savings Bank (Union) loaned Augie 2.1 million dollars secured
by Augie's real property. Augie later obtained a second loan from Union
secured by its accounts receivable, inventory, and equipment. Restivo,
on the other hand, had been a borrower from Manufacturer's Hanover
Trust Company (Hanover).6 0
The credit extended after the 1985 stock exchange created the ba-
sis for creditor Union's objection to the order of consolidation. Prior to
the debtors' bankruptcies, Hanover had advanced approximately 2.7
million dollars to Augie/Restivo. After Augie/Restivo and Augie were
forced into bankruptcy in 1986, Hanover entered into a series of cash
collateral stipulations with Augie/Restivo.' 6' The loans were secured by
assets of the debtor-in-possession, 62 Augie/Restivo, and therefore
granted Hanover a superpriority administrative expense claim. 6 The
157. 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
158. Id. at 519.
159. See id. at 516-17. Augie's affairs, however, were discontinued, and Restivo became the
sole operating company. A single set of books and financial statements were maintained under the
name of Augie/Restivo. Id. at 517.
160. Id. at 516-17.
161. Id. at 517. Section 363(a) and (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code address the use of cash
collateral by a debtor continuing business after filing a petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a), (c)(2)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987). In a cash collateral agreement, a debtor typically will deposit funds in a
specified account, and the creditor will make loans to the debtor up to an amount represented by
the deposited funds. The Augie/Restivo agreement stipulated that the accounts receivable of
Augie/Restivo constituted cash collateral. Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 517.
162. In most Chapter 11 cases the debtor will remain in possession of property of the estate
as "debtor-in-possession." A debtor will continue to operate its business as debtor-in-possession
until the bankruptcy court grants a party in interest's request for appointment of a trustee. The
debtor-in-possession's use of the property of the estate is subject to the supervision of the bank-
ruptcy judge pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. See DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 734-35.
163. AugielRestivo, 860 F.2d at 517. Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the
priority of unsecured claims against the estate. Certain administrative expenses receive first prior-
ity. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Two other Code sections, however, allow for
certain claims to receive superpriority status and these claims will receive payment before the §
507(a)(1) administrative expense claims. See id. §§ 364(c)(1), 507(b) (1982).
Section 507(b) grants superpriority status to creditors that permit the debtor to use property
1990]
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cash collateral stipulations repeatedly were renewed until the entire
amount of Hanover's prepetition loans to Augie/Restivo had been con-
verted into postpetition, superpriority administrative expense debt.164
Substantive consolidation would allow the equity in Augie's assets to be
used to pay the debts of Augie/Restivo and Restivo, including the 2.7
million dollar superpriority administrative expense claim to Hanover.16 5
Although Union's first loan secured by Augie's real property would con-
tinue to have priority as to that property, Union's second, undersecured
loan would be subordinated to Hanover's superpriority claim.16 6
The basis of the court's denial of consolidation stemmed from rec-
ognition of lenders' expectations when extending credit to a specific en-
tity.1 7 The court found that Union's loans to Augie were based solely
on Augie's financial position.6 8 Similarly, the court found that Hanover
had extended credit with knowledge that it was dealing with separate
entities. 6 9
secured by a lien in the debtor's reorganization. To the extent that the protection given to those
creditors is inadequate, the creditor will receive a superpriority. See id. § 507(b); see also S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-73 (1978). Section 364(c)(1) grants priority over all administrative
expenses, including § 507(b) claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1) (1982). Sections 364(c) and 364(d)
empower the bankruptcy court to authorize the debtor-in-possession (or trustee) to incur debt
with superpriority status. Such a superpriority may be authorized only if the debtor-in-possession
is unable to obtain credit and adequate protection of the original lien holder's interest exists. See
DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 987.
164. Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 517. This debt was secured by Augie/Restivo's accounts re-
ceivable and a subordinated mortgage on Augie's real property. Id.
165. The Augie assets also would be used to pay Augie/Restivo's and Restivo's priority tax
liabilities of more than $1.2 million. Id. at 517; cf. Holywell Corp. v. Bank of New York, 59 Bankr.
340 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986), appeal dismissed sub noma. Miami Center Ltd. Partnership v. Bank of
New York, 820 F.2d 376 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 69 (1988). In Holywell the court
recognized that substantive consolidation in the Chapter 11 reorganization involved the combina-
tion of the debtors' assets and liabilities as well as the elimination of interdebtor claims. The court,
however, held that interdebtor claims incurred under the authorization of the bankruptcy court
are excepted from elimination. Id. at 347 & n.6 (noting that certain interdebtor loans were allowed
by the bankruptcy court to enable debtors to continue operations).
166. Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 517.
167. Id. at 518-19. "[L]enders structure their loans according to their expectations regarding
that borrower and do not anticipate either having the assets of a more sound company available
... or having the creditors of a less sound debtor compete for the borrower's assets." Id. The
court recognized that interest rates and loan terms are based on these expectations. "[F]ulfilling
those expectations is therefore important to the efficiency of credit markets." Id. at 519. Substan-
tive consolidation would undermine such efficiency when creditors rely on the credit of specific
entities. Id.
168. The court also found that Union had no knowledge of the negotiations between Augie
and Restivo at the time that it made the loan. Id. The court held that Union's claim against
Augie's real estate was superior to that of Hanover and that "the undesirability of consolidation is
as clear in [this] case as it was in . . . Flora Mir. " Id. at 520.
169. Hanover sought and received a guarantee from Augie of Hanover's loans to Augie/Re-
stivo, including a subordinated mortgage on Augie's real property. Id. at 519. The court held that
the fact that trade creditors might have believed that they were dealing with a single entity was
insufficient to justify consolidation. Id. The court looked at Hanover as the principal beneficiary of
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The court also dismissed an argument that the entanglement of the
debtors' affairs warranted consolidation.170 In keeping with Kheel,
AugielRestivo advised that substantive consolidation should be granted
only if all creditors will benefit because untangling is either impossible
or so costly that it will consume the assets of the estate. 1'7 Although
Augie/Restivo is the most recent appellate decision, it does not advance
new standards or factors. Like the decisions before it, Augie/Restivo
balances the interests of parties to be affected by consolidation and re-
spects the reliance interest of creditors that expect satisfaction of
claims solely from the particular entity to which credit was extended.
IV. ANCILLARY ISSUES AND TACTICAL USES OF SUBSTANTIVE
CONSOLIDATION
A. Individual Debtors and Statutory Exemptions
Substantive consolidation is not restricted to the corporate setting.
Bankruptcies of individuals may be consolidated with other individual
bankruptcies or with the bankruptcy of any affiliated entity. 72 The
court in In re Steury173 noted that the often cited factors for substan-
tive consolidation usually arise in a corporate setting and, therefore,
have little relevance to proceedings involving individual debtors. 74
Therefore, the court applied a two-step approach in which it stated that
first, a need for consolidation must be demonstrated, and second, the
benefits of consolidation must outweigh the harm it creates. 175 Steury
involved a trustee's motion to consolidate the separate involuntary
bankruptcies filed against husband and wife debtors who opposed
consolidation.
Steury illustrates the significance of substantive consolidation in
the individual debtor context because of the availability of statutory
exemptions under state law and the Bankruptcy Code.'76 Each debtor
consolidation and noted that Hanover was not deceived and knew that it was dealing with separate
corporate entities. Id.
170. Id. The bankruptcy court supported its order to consolidate by finding that it was
"doubtful if [the debtors' affairs] could ever be unknotted." Augie/Restivo, 84 Bankr. at 321.
171. Neither condition was met in the case. Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 519. For a discussion
of accounting difficulties in Kheel, see supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 55, 56, and accompanying text.
173. 94 Bankr. 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988).
174. Id. at 554.
175. Id.; see supra notes 72, 73, and accompanying text.
176. Generally all prebankruptcy property in which the debtor has an interest becomes
"property of the estate," but an individual debtor may exempt certain property from property of
the estate. Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code addresses what property an individual debtor may
exempt. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see also DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 740.
Section 522(d) contains a list of the federal exemptions that the Bankruptcy Code gives to an
individual. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Section 522(b)(1), however, recognizes that
1990]
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spouse in Steury claimed an Indiana exemption expressly available only
in bankruptcy. 177 The exemption concerns property held in tenancy by
the entireties and is not available if the debtors' cases are consolidated.
The debtors claimed that substantive consolidation inappropriately
prejudiced them by requiring forfeiture of the exemption.178
The court carefully examined the effect of the exemption both in
and out of bankruptcy before ultimately ordering a partial consolida-
tion. The court noted that because consolidation would aggregate the
assets and liabilities of each debtor, all creditors, whether joint or indi-
vidual, would become joint creditors of the consolidated estate and
would no longer be required to claim only the assets of the individual
debtor. Therefore, creditors that were not joint creditors prior to con-
solidation could reach all the assets of the other debtor as well as the
entireties property after consolidation. The claims that could be satis-
fied from the entireties property therefore would be increased. 179 The
court was concerned, however, because consolidation would reduce the
distribution to some creditors at the expense of others. 180 Thus, credi-
tors with joint claims would be required to share the proceeds of the
entireties property with creditors who otherwise would have no claim to
it. 181
states may have enacted their own list of exemptions. If a state has "opted out" of the federal
exemptions, the debtor must use the exemptions available under state law. See id. § 522(b)(1); see
also DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 741.
177. State law exemptions generally allow debtors a right to certain property free from credi-
tors in any judicial process. See DEBTORS, supra note 8, at 127. The Steury debtors invoked IND.
CODE § 34-2-28-1(a)(5). This statute provides that the debtor may exempt the following:
Any interest the judgment debtor has in real estate held as a tenant by the entireties on the
date of the filing of the petition for relief under the bankruptcy code, unless a joint petition
for relief is filed by the judgment debtor and spouse, or individual petitions of the judgment
debtor and spouse are subsequently consolidated.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-28-1(a)(5) (Burns 1986) (emphasis added).
178. See Steury, 94 Bankr. at 555. Because the exemption involved property held in tenancy
by the entireties, the court recognized that a creditor of only one spouse could not reach the prop-
erty for satisfaction of its claim. A joint creditor, however, could reach this property for satisfac-
tion of a joint spousal obligation. Thus, outside of bankruptcy, joint creditors could reach the
entire value of the entireties property. Id. Because separate bankruptcy petitions had been filed,
however, joint creditors could not reach the equity in the entireties property. Thus, the exemption
would remove completely the entireties property and its proceeds from the bankruptcy estate. Id.
Consequently, this property would not be available to satisfy any claim, joint or individual, against
the debtors. Thus, the court recognized that joint creditors would be required to share with all
other creditors the few other assets in the debtors' estates. Id. Absent consolidation, prejudice to
the creditors clearly would result.
179. Id. at 556.
180. Id. See generally Pedlar, Community Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 349, 353-54 (1979) (expressing a similar concern for creditors in the con-
text of community property).
181. See Steury, 94 Bankr. at 556.
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Therefore, the court exercised its equity powers 82 and held that
the debtors' cases should be consolidated but only to the extent that
the proceeds of the debtors' entireties property would be available for
payment of joint claims against the debtors.' s The court rejected the
debtors' argument that no partial substantive consolidation could occur
and held that equity allowed the court to shape a remedy to correct the
problem.'
B. Effective Date of Consolidation
What is the effective date of the consolidated entity's bankruptcy
filing? Often economics will force some related entities into bankruptcy
before others. Parent company management similarly may desire to file
bankruptcy for only certain subsidiaries or affiliates. Entities also may
face involuntary bankruptcy in which the creditors choose the time to
file a bankruptcy petition. Because each of these entities could qualify
as debtors within the Bankruptcy Code, they may be involved in bank-
ruptcy independently of the others. I8 5 If the entities are consolidated,
however, it is important to determine the proper date from which to
measure the rights of debtors and creditors in the event of
bankruptcy." 6
In In re Tureaud15 7 the bankruptcy proceeding began when an in-
voluntary petition was filed against the debtor in October 1982. In June
1983, however, the trustee filed an application for substantive consoli-
dation. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's application and, in
182. Id.; see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
183. Steury, 94 Bankr. at 557.
184. Id.
185. Bankruptcy Code § 101(12) defines "debtor" as a "person or municipality concerning
which a case under this title has been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982). Section 101(35)
defines "person" to include an individual, partnership, or corporation. See id. § 101(35) (Supp. V
1987); see also id. § 109 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (stating the requirements for "debtor" status under
the several bankruptcy chapters).
186. The filing date is significant in bankruptcy. Rights of creditors and debtors are mea-
sured against the filing date in several contexts. The filing of a petition in voluntary bankruptcy
begins the case. Id. § 301. Involuntary cases are commenced by the filing of a petition by a quali-
fied entity other than a debtor. See id. § 303(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Significantly, the filing of a petition operates as a stay against subsequent proceedings by
creditors to recover claims against the debtor. Id. § 362(a). The allowance of certain claims against
the bankrupt are measured from the filing date. See, e.g., id. § 502(b)(6) (landlord's claims); id. §
502(b)(7) (employee's damages); id. § 503(b)(1) (administrative expenses). Also, the filing date
measures what property comprises property of the estate. See id. § 541(a).
The trustee primarily is interested in the effective date of filing because fraudulent transfers
and preferences are measured by this date. A transfer made by a debtor on or within 90 days of
the filing of the petition may be deemed a preference and avoided by the trustee. See id. §
547(b)(4). Similarly, the trustee may avoid fraudulent transfers made on or within one year before
the filing of the petition. Id. § 548(a).
187. 59 Bankr. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986).
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January 1985, filed an order substantively consolidating the debtors' es-
tates."8 A creditor of the consolidated affiliates objected to the bank-
ruptcy court's selection of June 1983, the date of the trustee's
application for consolidation, as the effective date of consolidation. The
creditor argued that October 1982, the date of the involuntary petition
filing, should be the effective date. 8 ' Nevertheless, the court affirmed
the bankruptcy court's selection of June 1983 as the effective date,
holding that because nondebtors were included in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, the bankruptcy court was not rigidly fixed to the date of the
involuntary petition's filing.' e0
In In re DRW Property Co. 82's9 debtor real estate partnerships
requested substantive consolidation of the debtor entities with over one
hundred related nondebtor partnerships. 192 Although the debtors filed
voluntary petitions in 1985, they sought substantive consolidation as of
January 1, 1982, primarily for federal income tax purposes." 3 The court
denied consolidation' and held that it was unaware of any authority
that would allow substantive consolidation of the debtor entities into a
single limited partnership effective three years prior to the bankruptcy
filings.' ,5
In In re Evans Temple Church of God in Christ and Community
Center, Inc.19 6 the court held that the substantive consolidation of two
cases permitted the debtors to use the date of the earlier debtor's filing
to determine whether a payment made by the last debtor to file quali-
fied as a preference. 1 7 The court noted that when the assets and liabili-
188. Id. at 974-75.
189. Id. at 977. The creditor cited United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200, 207 (1939), for the
proposition that the substantive rights of a creditor against a bankrupt are fixed as of the filing of
the petition. Tureaud, 59 Bankr. at 977. The trustee, however, cited Bank of Matin v. England,
385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966), to emphasize the "essentially equitable nature" of bankruptcy courts.
Tureaud, 59 Bankr. at 977-78. The court finally conceded that it did not know of a case that
discussed "this precise issue." Id. at 978.
190. Tureaud, 59 Bankr. at 978 (noting that because of the bankruptcy court's equity pow-
ers, its choice of June 7, 1983, as the effective date of consolidation did not constitute an abuse of
discretion).
191. 54 Bankr. 489 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
192. Id. at 491.
193. Id. The application for substantive consolidation, effective Jan. 1, 1982, was filed in
anticipation of a deadline of Sept. 1985 set by the bankruptcy court'for the filing of plans of
reorganization. Substantive consolidation with the 109 nondebtor partnerships was sought in order
to form a single limited partnership for all purposes. The application for substantive consolidation
additionally requested a final determination that all assets and liabilities of the consolidated part-
nerships were "merged" into the consolidated partnership as of Jan. 1, 1982, three years prior to
the bankruptcy filings. Id.
194. Id. at 492.
195. Id. at 497.
196. 55 Bankr. 976 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
197. Id. at 981.
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ties of two debtors clearly are not separable and substantive
consolidation is warranted, the preference provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code require that the creditors of the consolidated debtors receive simi-
lar treatment. 198 The court found that the creditors would be protected
only by allowing the last debtor that filed bankruptcy the opportunity
to assume the earlier debtor's filing date.199
In In re Auto-Train Corp. °° the trustee moved to consolidate the
assets and liabilities of a subsidiary into the estate of the parent, effec-
tive as of the date of the parent's bankruptcy filing. Such a nunc pro
tunc201 order would enable the trustee to recover as a preference a pay-
ment that the subsidiary made to a creditor.
202
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, held that the nunc pro
tunc order was improper because it unduly prejudiced the creditor who
received the alleged preferential payment.20 3 The court assumed that
substantive consolidation was appropriate ' and addressed the issue of
198. Id. at 982 (analyzing the policy behind bankruptcy's preference avoidance provisions).
199. Id. at 983. When a case is substantively consolidated a court is making the following
determination:
[T]he assets and liabilities of one debtor are substantially the same assets and liabilities of
the second debtor, or that the two are hopelessly intertwined, and that the unsecured credi-
tors of both debtors would best be protected by pooling the assets and liabilities of the two
debtors.
Id. at 982.
200. 810 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
201. One authority has defined nunc pro tunc:
Now for then. A phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be
done, with a retroactive effect, i.e., with the same effect as if regularly done. Nunc pro tunc
entry is an entry made now of something actually previously done to have effect of former
date.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 964 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). The Auto-Train court examined
the divergent treatment of orders nunc pro tunc by courts:
Some have said [that orders nunc pro tunc] are allowable only to make the record reflect
something that actually happened but was not recorded, some that [the orders] may be en-
tered to achieve equity even though so doing supplies an action that did not occur on the
earlier date. But even courts taking the broader view have only granted such orders under
extraordinary circumstances where they will not prejudice any party or frustrate the pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Code.
Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 275 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). "Accordingly, even on the ex-
pansive view of the role of a nunc pro tunc order, we find it unjustifiable in the present case." Id.
at 276 n.5.
202. Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 273. The creditor objected to the motion for consolidation and
resulting avoidance of the transfer on the grounds that the bankruptcy court lacked the power to
consolidate the subsidiary into the parent's estate nunc pro tunc. Id. The bankruptcy court ruled
in favor of the trustee. Id.
203. Id. at 275-76. Although the Bankruptcy Code compels certain transferees to restore to
the debtor property received within 90 days of the date that the debtor files a petition, "it would
thwart the Code's policies to require transferees to disgorge solely on the basis of a bankruptcy
filing by their debtor's apparently distinct affiliate." Id. at 276.
204. Id.
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giving the consolidation order a retroactive effect. The court ruled that
once consolidation is deemed appropriate, a bankruptcy court must un-
dertake an additional balancing process before exercising its equitable
nunc pro tunc powers.205 A consolidation order should be granted nunc
pro tunc only when the retroactive effect will yield greater benefits than
the harm it inflicts.20 6 Similar to the original question of the propriety
of consolidation, the court posited that the party favoring a nunc pro
tunc order must show some benefit to be achieved by its allowance. A
creditor that holds an allegedly preferential payment can challenge
such a showing by proving reliance on the separate credit of an entity
to be consolidated and showing that the creditor will be harmed by a
shift in the filing dates. 0
Auto-Train especially is concerned with the detrimental effect that
retroactive treatment of a consolidation order will visit on bankruptcy's
twofold policy of preventing creditors from racing to the courthouse
and facilitating equality of distribution among creditors.2 08 The court
feared that ordering consolidation nunc pro tunc without consideration
of a transferee's reliance on an entity's separateness would accelerate
the race among creditors. Such a rule would heighten creditors' reluc-
tance to extend credit to troubled companies and would incite creditors
to demand satisfaction of their claims upon any showing of weakness by
the debtor.0 9
C. The Standard of Accounting Difficulties
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel 1 ° granted substan-
tive consolidation on the ground that the financial records and affairs of
the respective debtors were so hopelessly obscured that to untangle
them would threaten any recovery to creditors.21 1 Similarly, In re Com-
mercial Envelope Manufacturing Co.2"2 allowed substantive consolida-
tion because of the difficulty and astronomical cost of performing an
205. Id.
206. Id. at 277 (noting that this inquiry closely parallels the balancing test used for motions
for consolidation).
207. Such a challenge was successful in Auto-Train. If the challenger meets this burden, the
court must then determine whether the benefits of a nunc pro tunc order outweigh its detriments.
Id. at 277.
208. Id. at 276-77; see Thornton, supra note 14, at 456.
209. Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 277.
210. 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966).
211. See id. at 847 (2d Cir. 1966); supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text. The extent to
which the assets of separate debtors are "hopelessly obscured" must be determined on a case-by-
case basis. In re DRW Property Co. 82, 54 Bankr. 489, 496 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985). For a discus-
sion of administrative expenses and their priority status, see supra note 114.
212. 14 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 191 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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audit necessary to disentangle the debtors' assets and liabilities.213
Under these high standards, proponents of consolidation who base their
argument on accounting difficulties rarely succeed.2 1'
Substantive consolidation is not a matter of procedural conve-
nience.2 15 The court in In re Gulfco Investment Corp.218 advised that if
detailed, certified audits are not possible, at least some accounting stud-
ies and evaluations should be made.2 17 In addition, even in cases in
which accounting barriers favor consolidation, if an objecting creditor
can demonstrate that the assets and liabilities of its particular debtor
are sufficiently distinct from the other debtors', the court may refuse to
consolidate that debtor.218
In In re DRW Property Co. 82219 proponents of consolidation ar-
gued that the expense of unscrambling the debtor entities' relationships
would consume all of the assets available for creditors. Despite expert
testimony that disentangling the books and records of the debtors
would require six additional months of audit work costing approxi-
mately two million dollars, the court held that the problem of account-
ing difficulties was insufficient to invoke an order of substantive
consolidation. 2 0 Thus, an argument for consolidation based solely on
accounting difficulties is insufficient to invoke substantive consolidation
when the reliance interests of creditors are threatened.
D. Consolidation with Nondebtors
Entities that may be consolidated include individuals, partner-
ships, corporations, and related affiliates, including nondebtors. 21 Con-
solidation of debtor and nondebtor entities, although possible, should
occur only in unusual circumstances.222 Such consolidation threatens
solvent entities. A separate, solvent entity may be forced into liquida-
213. Id. at 194.
214. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
215. In re Flora Mir Candy Corp., 432 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1970).
216. 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
217. Gulfco, 593 F.2d at 930. The studies and evaluations are necessary because further ac-
tion in substantive consolidation cases is dependent wholly on the underlying facts. See id.
218. See, e.g., Flora Mir, 432 F.2d at 1063 (noting that although there might have been
problems with the intercompany accounts among the other debtors in the case, the accounting
problems respecting Meadors were few).
219. 54 Bankr. 489, 495-96 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (involving real estate debtors).
220. See id. at 496-97. The court noted that reconciliation of accounts could be done on a
property, but not a partnership, basis. Such an absence of consolidation would allow secured credi-
tors to reach rents generated from specific real estate properties. See id. at 497.
221. See supra notes 55, 56, and accompanying text.
222. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, T 1100.06[3], at 1100-46. Cases consolidating
debtors with nondebtors include Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941),
and In re Tureaud, 59 Bankr. 973 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986).
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tion through consolidation with a bankrupt affiliate, further threatening
the solvent entity's creditors.223 The Supreme Court in Sampsell v. Im-
perial Paper & Color Corp.224 noted that the creditors of the nondebtor
would be entitled to satisfy their claims out of the nondebtor's assets
before any participation by the creditors of the debtor. Finally, in order
to fulfill procedural due process requirements, the bankruptcy court
may not take any action that would prejudice the creditors of the
nondebtor without giving them an opportunity to be heard.225
E. Appellate Standard of Review
United States district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from
final judgments, orders, and decrees from interlocutory orders of bank-
ruptcy judges entered in core and noncore proceedings.226 Appeals in
bankruptcy cases generally reach the courts of appeals through 28
U.S.C. section 158(d). 27 In core proceedings, the bankruptcy judge's
conclusions of law are subject to de novo review, but findings of fact
merely are subject to a clearly erroneous standard.22
In In re Tureaud229 the court addressed the standard of review re-
223. Seligson & Mandell, supra note 35, at 346. "In that situation all that the trustee should
be entitled to recover should be the equity in the related entity and that could well be obtained
without forcing that entity into a pending bankruptcy proceeding." Id.
224. 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941).
225. Seligson & Mandell, supra note 35, at 345; see also Comment, Substantive Consolida-
tion: The Back Door to Involuntary Bankruptcy, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 203, 210 (1986) (expressing
due process concerns of nondebtors).
226. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (Supp. V 1987); see S. SNYDER & L. PONOROFF, COMMERCIAL BANK-
RuPTcY LITIGATION § 4.01, at 4-1, -2 (1989). Core proceedings include those that affect liquidation
of the estate or adjustment of the debtor-creditor relationship. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(O)
(Supp. V 1987); see also infra notes 230, 231, and accompanying text.
227. The statute states: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion." 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. V 1987); see United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 204 (3d
Cir. 1988). The procedural rules governing appeals differ based on the court to which the appeal is
brought: Appeals from bankruptcy courts to district courts are governed by Part VIR of the Bank-
ruptcy Rules. S. SNYDER & L. PONOROFF, supra note 226, § 4.03, at 4-26. Appeals to the courts of
appeals are governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. An appeal in a core pro-
ceeding is commenced by filing a notice of appeal in conformity with Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a). Id.
§ 4.03[1], at 4-27. Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) requires that the notice of appeal be filed within ten
days from the judgment or order that is the subject of appeal. BANKR. R. 8002(a); S. SNYDER & L.
PONOROFF, supra note 226, § 4.03[2], at 4-30.
228. BANER. R. 8013; S. SNYDER & L. PONOROFF, supra note 226, § 4.03[3], at 4-38. Both
factual findings and conclusions of law in a noncore proceeding are reviewed de novo. See In re
Production Steel, Inc., 48 Bankr. 841, 844 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985). But cf. S. SNYDER & L. Po-
NOROFF, supra note 226, § 2.04, at 2-18 to -19 (noting that although bankruptcy judge's factual
findings in noncore proceedings may be reviewed de novo, "the district judge is not likely to re-
ceive new evidence and normally accepts the bankruptcy judge's findings if supported by the
record").
229. 59 Bankr. 973, 975 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1986).
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quired of district courts in substantive consolidation cases. The court
addressed the distinction between core and noncore bankruptcy pro-
ceedings discussed in section 157 of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 and concluded that a substantive consol-
idation order may be characterized as a core proceeding pursuant to
section 157(b)(2) (O).230 Core proceedings primarily include those that
affect liquidation of the estate or adjustment of the debtor-creditor re-
lationship. 231 Therefore, the court deferred to the bankruptcy court's
decision that the proceeding was a core proceeding and held that the
bankruptcy court's order should be reviewed under the clearly errone-
ous standard for findings of fact and the de novo standard for conclu-
sions of law.23 2
F. Consolidation Pursuant to a Plan of Reorganization
Consolidation may be achieved by an express proposal in a reor-
ganization plan.233 Through reorganization plans, debtors seek approval
for substantive consolidation from the creditors that vote on the plan.
Because of the growth of conglomerates and the increasing number of
interconnected corporations, more reorganizations likely will involve
substantive consolidation.23 4 Critically, creditors who oppose a plan's
proposal of substantive consolidation must timely object to the proposal
during the plan's confirmation hearing. Because the creditor in In re
Sweetwater s 5 failed to object to a proposal for substantive consolida-
tion in the bankruptcy court, the creditor was precluded from raising
the objection on appeal.
230. See id. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0) states that "[core proceedings include. . . proceedings
affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 147(b)(2)(O) (Supp. V 1987).
The bankruptcy judge must determine whether a proceeding is core or noncore. See id. §
157(b)(3); S. SNYDER & L. PONOROFF, supra note 226, § 2.04, at 2-19. The Tureaud court noted that
the bankruptcy judge determined that the consolidation proceeding was a core proceeding. This
finding was bolstered by the fact that a final order was entered in the bankruptcy court rather
than a mere submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Such submissions are
required for noncore proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
231. See supra note 226; see also In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing
core from noncore proceedings).
232. Tureaud, 59 Bankr. at 975.
233. See B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 25, 1 8.16, at 8-77; see, e.g., In re Apex Oil
Co., 101 Bankr. 92, 94 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989); supra notes 134, 135, and accompanying text; see
also supra note 50 (discussing reorganization plans within the Bankruptcy Code).
234. B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 25, 1 8.16, at 8-78. Substantive consolidation
most often arises in multicorporate petitions. R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS, §
2.0413], at 2-26 (1989).
235. 57 Bankr. 354, 359 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985). Like final judgments, confirmed plans of
reorganization are binding on all parties, and issues that could have been raised pertaining to such
plans are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In re Silver Mill Frozen Foods, Inc., 23 Bankr.
179, 183 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982); see In re Sanders, 81 Bankr. 496, 498 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987).
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Section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code restricts the classification
of creditors under a plan of reorganization.3 6 If the relative rights and
priorities of two classes of creditors are the same, the plan may not
treat the classes differently unless both classes accept the plan, or the
proposed treatment provides each class with property having substan-
tially equal value.2 87 In a substantive consolidation case, however, a
creditor originally having a claim against a more solvent company may
be entitled to more favorable treatment under the plan than a creditor
with a claim against a less solvent entity, notwithstanding that the two
claims have equal rights and priorities."'
Unless a reorganization plan proposing substantive consolidation
receives unanimous approval from the creditors, the court must make
an independent determination of whether consolidation is appropri-
ate.2 9 If approved, a plan of reorganization could eliminate accounting
and litigation expenses necessary to straighten debtor affairs and finan-
cial records. Conversely, without disentangled records, the bankruptcy
court will have difficulty ascertaining whether Bankruptcy Code section
1129(a)(7) is satisfied because the court will be required to determine
what each creditor would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation absent
consolidation.240
Commentators recognize that section 1129(b)'s unfair discrimina-
tion test may present problems in a case concerning the substantive
consolidation of two debtors, one of which has issued subordinated
debt.2 41 The commentators note that whether the unsecured debt of the
236. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1982).
237. 5 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUI E 90.10[5], at 90-184 to -185 (S. Herzog and L.
King 1981).
238. Both may be general unsecured claims. Id. 90.1015], at 90-185 n.37; see also In re
Interstate Stores, Inc., 15 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 634, 642-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1978).
239. 5 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1100.0614], at 1100-46 to -47.
240. Id. at 1100-47. Section 1129(a)(7) of the Code states:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:
(7) With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests-
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class-
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan. . . property of a value. . . that is not less than
the amount that such holder would so receive ... under [C]hapter 7 ....
11 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
241. See Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1125 (1985).
Section 1129(b)(1) states:
[I]f all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section other than paragraph
(8) are met with respect to a plan, the court. . . shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the
requirements of such paragraph if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982).
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consolidated corporation is entitled to the subordination provisions is
not clear. Subordinated debenture holders presumably bargain for sub-
ordination to the debt of only one corporation.242 If the terms of deben-
ture holders' indenture permit a merger, however, they arguably are not
affected adversely by substantive consolidation.243
G. Tactical Use of Substantive Consolidation
1. Use by Attorneys to Assure Payment of Fees
The court in In re Parkway Calabasas, Ltd.244 expressed surprise
about the frequent lack of objection to motions for substantive consoli-
dation. Unsecured creditors typically comprise the group that fails to
object. The court reasoned that this class of creditors likely has lost
hope or interest by the time a bankruptcy proceeding advances to the
point when substantive consolidation is requested.24 5
The court skeptically proposed, however, that more sinister reasons
for a lack of objection may be present. The court noted that often but a
single trustee, a single law firm representing the trustee, a single com-
mittee of unsecured creditors, and a single law firm representing this
committee exist.2 46 This situation creates a "hopelessly irresolvable"
conflict of interest on a motion for substantive consolidation.247 Curi-
ously, the court noted, the attorneys are not immobilized by the con-
flict. Rather, they usually support a motion for consolidation.2 4 The
court feared, therefore, that support for consolidation was motivated by
the selfish purpose of assuring payment for fees incurred while perform-
ing services for an administratively insolvent estate.249
242. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 241, at 1125.
243. See id.
244. 89 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
245. Id. at 835 n.3. Nevertheless, the unsecured creditors' committees and counsel actively
should be seeking the best interests of the "disillusioned creditors" and scrutinizing the effect of
substantive consolidation for possible unfairness. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. Because a particular debtor may have a cause of action against any of its affiliates, a
common trustee for an affiliated group faces a conflict of interest. Substantive consolidation would
appear to resolve this conflict by combining the assets and liabilities of the affiliates. Substantive
consolidation, however, may benefit one creditor group at the expense of another and a trustee's
recommendation for substantive consolidation "creates a conflict of interest in and of itself." 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 5, 1100.07, at 1100-50.
248. Parkway Calabasas, 89 Bankr. at 835 n.3.
249. Id. As a penalty for this conflict, the court suggested a reduction or complete denial of
compensation. Id. For a recent administrative consolidation case denying fees to attorneys who
were not disinterested, see In re Petro-Serve, Ltd., 97 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989).
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2. The Government As a Lien Creditor or Priority Holder
The United States successfully argued for consolidation in Chemi-
cal Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel. 50 The Government, a creditor
holding a statutory tax lien, feared the depletion of available assets if
attempts were made to unscramble the debtors' financial affairs. 51 Be-
cause of the United States' enhanced tax lien status, Judge Friendly
was unimpressed with the Government's argument for equality among
creditors. 52 Nevertheless, the majority approved consolidation on the
unprecedented basis of accounting difficulties.5 3
Similarly, the FDIC argued successfully against consolidation in In
re Gulfco Investment Corp.254 The FDIC recognized that absent consol-
idation, it would recover one hundred percent if allowed to pursue a
subsidiary guarantee. In a consolidation, however, the FDIC would be
relegated to an unsecured status and would recover only twenty percent
of its claim.255
3. Other Tactical Uses
Substantive consolidation may be used tactically to achieve what
bankruptcy otherwise would deny. In In re Steury256 substantive con-
solidation was used by the trustee to bring exempt property into the
bankruptcy estate. Similarly, in In re Parkway Calabasas, Ltd.2517 the
substantive consolidation of two debtors effected a merger of the two
and eliminated what would have been a fraudulent transfer. The court
in Unsecured Creditors Committee v. Leavitt Structural Tubing258 sug-
gested that a committee of creditors could have sought substantive con-
solidation in order to give the committee standing to bring an appeal
from an order approving a plan of reorganization. Finally, the court in
In re S.L Acquisition, Inc. suggested substantive consolidation as a
250. 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966); see supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
251. See Berry, supra note 2, at 359.
252. "[T]he argument for equality has a specially hollow ring when made by the United
States whose priority over other creditors will necessarily be enhanced by having the assets of all
these corporations thrown into [the] hotchpot." Kheel, 369 F.2d at 848 (Friendly, J., concurring).
.253. Id. at 847; see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
254. 593 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1979).
255. Id. at 925; see also supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (discussing Gulfco).
256. 94 Bankr. 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); see supra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
257. 89 Bankr. 832, 839 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988). The merger of the debtors would eliminate
both the harm to one and the unjust enrichment of the other. The harm to debtor Granada's
creditors would be eliminated because the asset pool available to pay them would be increased by
the addition of debtor Phase I's assets to the pool, including the "enrichment" payment to Phase I.
Id.; see also supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text (discussing preferences).
258. 55 Bankr. 710, 711-12 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1985). Because the case involved merely proce-
dural consolidation and the committee could not demonstrate that it was an "aggrieved person"
with the right to appeal, the committee's appeal was dismissed. Id.
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means to bring defendants in a state court action into the bankruptcy
proceeding when court action otherwise would be precluded by bank-
ruptcy's automatic stay.259
V. CONCLUSION
Substantive consolidation in bankruptcy is a powerful tool. Yet, for
a doctrine that affects so vitally the substantive rights of creditors and
debtors, the Bankruptcy Code provides scant statutory guidance gov-
erning substantive consolidation's application. But because substantive
consolidation requires careful analysis of rights, interests, and factual
predicates, perhaps the courts may best determine on an ad hoc basis
when and how far substantive consolidation will be applied.
With the increased use of complex corporate structures, substan-
tive consolidation likely will appear more frequently in reorganization
plans and bankruptcy litigation. Debtors, creditors, incorporators, and
their respective affiliates and attorneys should be apprised of substan-
tive consolidation's efficacy in order to plan for a more profitable and
predictable operation of business affairs. But substantive consolidation
is not an ill-defined trap to be feared. Certain enterprises and their re-
lated affiliates may be suited for consolidation. Debtors, creditors, and
courts are best served by knowing and following the proper analysis to
determine the propriety of substantive consolidation in each case. Cred-
itors can find assurance in the courts' careful practice to grant requests
for consolidation only in terms consistent with the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.
J. Stephen Gilbert*
259. See In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1154 n.13 (5th Cir. 1987).
* The Author wishes to thank his wife, Kimberly Hill Gilbert, for her assistance and support.
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